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Verifiability on the run: an experimental study on the verifiability
approach to malingered symptoms
Irena Boskovica,b, Claudia Tejada Gallardoa, Aldert Vrijb, Lorraine Hopeb and Harald
Merckelbacha
aForensic Psychology Section, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands; bDepartment of
Psychology, Portsmouth University, Portsmouth, UK
Several studies on the verifiability approach found that truth-tellers report more verifiable
details than liars. Therefore, we wanted to test whether such a difference would emerge in
the context of malingered symptoms. We obtained statements from undergraduates (N D 53)
who had been allocated to three different conditions: truth-tellers, coached malingerers and
na€ıve malingerers. Truth-tellers carried out an intensive physical exercise and after a short
interval wrote a report about their experience and elicited symptoms. The two malingering
groups had to fabricate a story about the physical activity and its symptoms. Truth-tellers did
not generate more verifiable details than malingerers. However, malingerers reported more
non-verifiable details than truth-tellers. Coached and na€ıve malingerers did not differ in this
respect. Relative to truth-tellers, na€ıve malingerers reported more symptoms-related non-
verifiable details, while coached malingerers reported more exercise-related non-verifiable
details. Focusing on non-verifiable details may inform the detection of malingered
symptoms.
Key words: deception detection; malingering; symptoms; verifiability approach.
Malingering is defined as ‘the intentional pro-
duction of false or grossly exaggerated physi-
cal or psychological symptoms, motivated by
external incentives’ (Diagnostic and Statisti-
cal Manual of Mental Disorders–Fifth
Edition, DSM–5; American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation, 2013, APA, p. 726). Malingering
may be driven by several incentives, such as
financial compensation (e.g. benefits eligibil-
ity), legal outcomes (e.g. reducing or avoid-
ing sentences), privileges (e.g. receiving
stimulant medication), or other advantages
(e.g. avoiding undesirable work). Because
malingering may obscure diagnostic deci-
sion-making, it is important to rule it out
whenever these incentives may play a role in
patients presenting with symptoms (Vilar-
Lopez et al., 2007). To this end, clinicians or
researchers may employ screening instru-
ments and collateral data from different sour-
ces (e.g. medical records; Mittenberg, Patton,
Canyock, & Condit, 2002).
Currently, the majority of research papers
on malingering are concerned with tests and
tasks that intend to identify malingerers (for
reviews see Smith, 2008; Sollman & Berry,
2011). However, how malingerers talk about
their symptoms and whether their speech or
written reports may contain cues to malinger-
ing (e.g. verbal cues of malingering) has
received less attention in the research litera-
ture. According to the DSM–5 (APA, 2013),
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malingerers exhibit a lack of co-operation
when they are evaluated by medical profes-
sionals. This would seem to imply that malin-
gerers are reluctant to talk about their
symptoms (see also Worley, Feldman, &
Hamilton, 2015). However, there is no empir-
ical evidence to support this assumption, and,
in fact, there are even indications to the con-
trary. In a recent study by Akehurst et al.
(2015), participants were instructed to
undergo a cold pressor procedure and then
either honestly reported or exaggerated their
symptoms. To screen for malingering, half of
the interviewers used a checklist based on cri-
teria from different verbal veracity assess-
ment methods such as Criteria Based Content
Analysis (CBCA; see Blandon-Gitlin, Pez-
dek, Lindsay, & Hagen, 2009; Steller &
Kohnken, 1989) and Reality Monitoring
(RM; Johnson & Raye, 1981; see Bogaard,
Meijer, Vrij, Broers, & Merckelbach, 2013).
Interviewers who used the checklist obtained
a 75% correct classification of truth-tellers
and a 66% correct classification of the exag-
gerators. Without the checklist, interviewers
performed at a level no better than chance
(50%). Interestingly, exaggerators generated
more unusual details in their accounts than
truth-tellers, which runs counter to the clini-
cal impression that malingerers are reluctant
to talk about their symptoms.
Another approach that may help in identi-
fying malingered symptom reports is the veri-
fiability approach (Nahari & Vrij, 2014). It is
based on the idea that liars want to provide
statements that are rich in details, because
they believe that such statements will be con-
vincing. At the same time, they are reluctant
to include too many details because they fear
that too many details will provide leads for
investigators. One way to resolve this
dilemma is to provide an abundance of details
that an investigator cannot check (i.e. unveri-
fiable details). Research has shown that rela-
tive to truth-tellers, liars do indeed provide
fewer details that can be verified and more
details that cannot be verified (Nahari, Leal,
Vrij, Warmelink, & Vernham, 2014; Nahari,
Vrij, & Fisher, 2014a, 2014b). This so-called
verifiability effect has been observed in mock
crimes (Nahari et al., 2014a, 2014b) and in
false insurance claims settings (Harvey, Vrij,
Nahari, & Ludwig, 2017; Nahari et al., 2014;
Vrij, Nahari, Isitt, & Leal, 2016).
The verifiability approach states that the
verifiability of provided details distinguishes
liars from truth-tellers (Nahari et al., 2014).
This focus on potential checkability deviates
from traditional verbal veracity assessment
methods (i.e. CBCA and RM) that primarily
look at aspects such as the quantity of percep-
tual details and the reproduction of dialogues
in the reports of liars and truth-tellers. The
difference between the verifiability approach
and CBCA in terms of ability to detect decep-
tion becomes more pronounced when individ-
uals have prior knowledge about how the
veracity assessment method works (Nahari
et al., 2014). That is, the effectiveness of the
CBCA approach as a tool for detecting fabri-
cated statements is impaired when interview-
ees are informed beforehand about the
working of CBCA (Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara
& Bull, 2002). In contrast, the verifiability
effect appears to become stronger after inter-
viewees have been given an information pro-
tocol informing interviewees that their
statements might be checked for verifiable
details (Harvey et al., 2016; Vrij et al., 2016).
In two exploratory studies (Boskovic,
Bogaard, Merckelbach, Vrij, & Hope, 2017),
we examined the verifiability effect in the
context of malingered symptoms. Previous
verifiability studies were primarily oriented
towards coding external details (e.g. percep-
tual, spatial, temporal), without including
subjective details such as emotions or cogni-
tive operations because of their unverifiable
status (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012). Like
emotions, symptoms are subjective experien-
ces. However, there is an important differ-
ence between emotions and symptom reports.
As a rule, genuine symptoms lead to specific
behaviours associated with those symptoms (
e.g. going to/calling the doctor, taking medi-
cations, restricted activity, not going to work/
studies, complaining to others, googling
symptoms) that can be documented,
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witnessed or carried out with another person.
For example, 58% of people experiencing
common symptoms (e.g. headaches) tend to
use medication (prescribed or not), 48%
make complaints to a friend or a family mem-
ber, 24% reduce activity, and 5% actually
consult a medical professional (Verbrugge &
Ascione, 1987). Thus, the behavioural
sequelae of their symptoms are, in principle,
verifiable.
In our exploratory studies (Boskovic
et al., 2017), we asked people to describe
genuine physical symptoms or to fabricate an
account about these symptoms. When partici-
pants were not informed about the details
they should provide, a heightened number of
non-verifiable details (rather than a lack of
verifiable details) was typical for fabricated
symptom reports. Previous verifiability stud-
ies also noted that liars provide more non-ver-
ifiable details than truth-tellers (Vrij et al.,
2016). In our studies, the abundance of non-
verifiable details in fabricated symptom
reports was so pronounced that it led to a
marked difference between malingerers and
honest participants in the length of their
symptom descriptions, with malingerers’
statements being significantly longer (Bos-
kovic et al., 2017). This pattern (i.e. longer
statements by deceptive interviewees) contra-
dicts many deception studies (see DePaulo,
2003; Vrij, 2000), but is in accordance with
people’s belief that deceptive reports include
more details rather than fewer (Granhag,
Andersson, Str€omwall, & Hartwig, 2004).
Our finding is also consistent with that of
Akehurst et al. (2015) who observed that
exaggerators provide more unusual symptom
descriptions than do truth-tellers.
In our exploratory work, we also evalu-
ated the information protocol (i.e. instructing
participants that details might be checked).
This manipulation did not reduce the volume
of verifiable details in malingerers as opposed
to truth-tellers. Instead, malingerers reported
false verifiable details and in particular
reported false witnesses who they claimed
could confirm their stories. Thus, we did not
observe the typical verifiability effect. This
discrepancy with previous verifiability stud-
ies might be related to the differences in
investigated contexts (malingering symptoms
versus lying about events or actions). For
example, providing a false witness in a crimi-
nal context requires a conspirator who is will-
ing to confirm a false alibi. Things are quite
different for malingerers. They do not need to
reveal that they are being deceptive to those
who might be asked to confirm their story
(e.g. friends, family). Thus, a malingerer can
lie about his/her symptoms in front of others,
which makes it easier to create a convincing
account with false verifiable details.
The absence of a typical verifiability
effect (i.e. honest people reporting more veri-
fiable details than malingerers) in our explor-
atory studies might have been caused by
truth-tellers’ symptoms not being salient
enough. That is, truth-tellers may have
described mild symptoms that had no behav-
ioural sequelae. Furthermore, their statements
were based on retrospective self-reports, and
we could not determine whether their symp-
toms were also present at the moment they
described them (Boskovic et al., 2017).
With this in mind, we wanted to test
whether a verifiability effect occurs when
symptoms are actually elicited in truth-tellers,
while malingerers only fabricate a story about
them. Eliciting symptoms allows for control-
ling the time and duration of the symptoms in
truth-tellers. This way, truth-tellers share an
identical experience and report about acute
symptoms shortly after they have occurred,
which makes symptom reports less dependent
on memory (e.g. Miranda, Gold, Gore, &
Punnett, 2006). Thus, in the current study,
participants either took part in or imagined
taking part in an exhausting activity (running
up and down the stairs) and were then told to
report about the activity. Several studies have
found that liars often use details of previous
experiences when lying (i.e. embedded lies;
Leins, Fisher, & Ross, 2013), and that malin-
gerers mostly report about symptoms they are
familiar with (Dandachi-FitzGerald &
Merckelbach, 2013). Thus, successful malin-
gerers may embed a lie about an activity (e.g.
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Gnisci, Caso, & Vrij, 2010; Nahari & Vrij,
2014) and its symptoms in an event that they
really experienced at one time. Thus, we
coached one malinger group to use embedded
lies (e.g. recalling previous experiences of
running and related symptoms and report
them as current symptoms) to investigate the
efficacy of that strategy. Na€ıve malingerers
were not given any specific instructions how
to malinger the physical symptoms of run-
ning. We predicted that truth-tellers would
produce more verifiable details and a higher
proportion of verifiable details, whereas
malingerers would generate more non-verifi-
able details (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, we
expected to find differences between the two
malingering groups, such that an embedded
lies-strategy would enable coached malinger-
ers to fabricate more verifiable details about
their experience than na€ıve malingerers
(Hypothesis 2).
Method
Participants
A total of 53 (42 women) university students
participated in the study. Their average age
was M D 21.13 years (SD D 2.56), with a
range from 18 to 29 years. Participants were
assigned to three different conditions: truth-
tellers (n D 18), na€ıve malingerers (n D 17)
and coached malingerers (n D 18). Students
were compensated with either a course credit
point or a voucher valued €7.50. The study
was approved by the standing ethical commit-
tee of the Faculty of Psychology and Neuro-
science, Maastricht University (ECP-157 01
10 2015).
All participants were pre-screened for
health problems and poor physical condi-
tion. None of 18 participants who were
assigned to the physical exercise condition
reported any serious health issues, nor were
they taking medication at the time of the
experiment. The majority (n D 16) exer-
cised more than three times a week, while
two people reported working out only once
a month. In the malinger groups (n D 35),
three participants reported having health
problems, and four were taking medica-
tions. In total, 33 participants exercised reg-
ularly, while two participants reported not
being physically active.
Procedure
Truth-tellers had to perform two tasks. The
first task intended to induce symptoms, while
the second gave participants the opportunity
to exhibit certain symptom-related behav-
iours (e.g. talk to a friend about it, go to the
nearby pharmacy). The first task was carried
out in small groups in the stairways of a uni-
versity building, which was next to the hospi-
tal (a picture of the stairs is given in
Appendix 1). Participants were instructed to
run down and up the stairs, from the third
floor to the ground floor, twice, as quickly as
they could. This exercise was followed by a
30-min break (second task) in which partici-
pants could go wherever they wanted in (e.g.
library, cafe, restaurant, pharmacy, home).
After their return to the laboratory, they
needed to write a statement about their expe-
rience during the physical exercise, including
descriptions of their symptoms, and all the
details about the exercise itself, and about
what they did during the break. They were
instructed to describe the experience (e.g. sur-
roundings, their actions, and symptoms dur-
ing the exercise and the break) including as
many details as possible.
Both malingering groups were told about
truth-tellers’ assignment and were instructed
that they had to convince researchers they
were truth-tellers. Malingerers were given a
general description of truth-tellers’ exercise
(where and when it happened) and of the
instruction to take a break of 30 minutes after
the exercise. They were students, and so they
were familiar with the environment in which
the study took place (e.g. where the stairs
were, the writings and pictures on the walls,
the close-by library, hospital and shops in
which students could have gone during the
break). Malingerers were instructed to fabri-
cate a statement that included as many details
as possible about their actions and bodily
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sensations and overall experience during the
running and the break. However, while one
group was just told to fabricate the statements
(na€ıve malingerers), the coached malingerers
were given additional instructions how to fab-
ricate their statements. First, they were
instructed to recall the last time they had per-
formed an intense physical activity (e.g. run-
ning, mountain climbing). Second, they were
asked to write everything they could remem-
ber about the symptoms they experienced
during that activity, but to pretend that they
experienced those physical symptoms during
and after participation in this study (running
down and up the stairs). Thus, coached malin-
gerers were explicitly instructed to use a pre-
vious experience to lie about the target
experience in the current procedure. They
were also instructed to confabulate (embed
lies) about all the details of the exercise and
about what they did during the break. As in
the other conditions, participants were
encouraged to describe the experience pro-
viding as many details as possible (see
Appendix 2).
Written instructions for all tasks were
handed to participants and were also read
aloud by the researcher. After reading the
instructions, the researcher again repeated the
instructions, and participants were invited to
ask questions. Participants were told that they
could earn an extra credit point or voucher
(€7.50) if they were able to convince the
researchers that they had, indeed, carried out
the whole experiment (running and break).
Measures
Coding
One coder evaluated all statements, while a
second, independent coder coded a randomly
selected 25% of statements. Both coders were
blind to the three different conditions. In cod-
ing the statements, particular details were
excluded, such as information about the
researchers or anything that had been part of
the instructions. We excluded paraphrases of
the instructions to avoid artificially raised
levels of verifiable details among all three
groups.
Following Nahari and Vrij (2014), all
details were coded as either verifiable or non-
verifiable. For a detail to be coded as verifi-
able, it had to meet one of the following crite-
ria. The activities (a) were documented and
therefore potentially checkable (e.g. the
receipts for drinks or food; descriptions of
writings on the stairs or pictures on the
walls); (b) involved an action carried out
together with (an) other identified person(s)
(rather than alone or with a stranger who
could not easily be traced; e.g. identifying a
person in the group who participated in the
exercise as well); (c) pertained to something
that was witnessed by (an) other identified
person(s) (e.g. complaining to a friend during
the break about the symptoms); (d) recorded,
as mentioned by the examinee, on CCTV
cameras (e.g. being in the library/pharmacy/
nearby shops); (e) used potentially traceable
technology (e.g. use of cash machine, bank
cards, phone, tablet, computer); or (f) could
be checked by blood analysis and medical
tests (e.g. taking specific pills). The remain-
ing details were classified as unverifiable.
Inter-rater agreement between the two
coders, measured with inter-class correlation
coefficients (ICCs), was excellent for both
the verifiable (.99) and non-verifiable (.97)
details.
Symptom-related, exercise-related and
neutral details
We looked at overall frequencies of verifiable
and non-verifiable details. However, because
we were primarily interested in statements
about feigned and genuine symptoms and
their behavioural expressions, we also carried
out a more fine-grained analysis and coded
three categories: (a) symptom-related,
describing the symptoms (e.g. ‘sweating’;
‘pain in legs’; ‘shaking in front of Barry’);
(b) exercise-related, if details were referring
to running (‘I came second’; ‘I changed the
tempo’; ‘I bumped into my ex-tutor while
running’); and (c) neutral, describing
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activities that were not related to the symp-
toms or to the exercise, but still provided
insight in participants’ behaviour during the
break (‘I called my boyfriend’; ‘bought a
sandwich’; ‘sat on the sofa’).
All three types of details were coded as
verifiable or non-verifiable. ICCs indicated
strong agreement between the coders (all
ICCs > .79 and <.99).
Results
Number of verifiable and non-verifiable
details
Table 1 summarizes the main results. There
was no main effect of a group with respect to
the number of verifiable details, F(2, 50) D
0.78, p D .46. To test whether coached malin-
gerers would include more verifiable details
in their accounts than na€ıve malingerers
(Hypothesis 2), we contrasted the two malin-
gering groups with regard to their verifiable
details. Contrary to our prediction, the differ-
ence was not significant, t(33) D 1.32, p D
.25, d D 0.39. Neither did truth-tellers differ
from na€ıve malingerers, t(33) D 0.17, p D
.87, or coached malingerers, t(34) D 1.18,
p D .25, in terms of verifiable details.
There was a significant main effect of a
group with respect to the number of non-veri-
fiable details, F(2, 50) D 7.82, p D .001, h2 D
.24. Follow-up t tests indicated that na€ıve
malingers and coached malingerers produced
significantly more non-verifiable details than
truth-tellers [t(33) D 3.30, p D .002, d D
1.11; t(34) D 3.93, p D .001, d D 1.31,
respectively]. The two malingering groups
did not differ with respect to the number of
non-verifiable details, t(33) D 0.15, p D .88.
Thus, the pattern of non-verifiable and verifi-
able details across groups only partially sup-
ports Hypothesis 1.
Proportion of verifiable details
Across the sample, verifiable details were
reported by 28 participants (52.8%). From the
total number of details reported, only 4.4%
were verifiable. As in previous studies on ver-
ifiability, we calculated for each participant
the proportion of verifiable details – that is,
the ratio between the total number of check-
able details and overall number of details
(verifiable details/total of details). Next, we
ran a one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA). The three groups did not differ
regarding the proportion of verifiable details
reported, F(2, 50) D 2.07, p D .13, h2 D .08 .
Symptom-related, exercise-related and neu-
tral verifiable and non-verifiable details
Table 2 shows the means and standard devia-
tions of the three types of details across
groups. The groups differed significantly in
terms of symptom-related non-verifiable,
Table 1. Different detail categories and number of words in truth-tellers and na€ıve and coached
malingerers.
Group
Truth-tellers
(n D 18)
M (SD)
Na€ıve malingerers
(n D 17)
M (SD)
Coached malingerers
(n D 18)
M (SD)
Verifiable details 6.78 (9.85) 7.41 (12.27) 3.67 (5.38)
Proportion of verifiable details .07 (.11) .04 (.06) .02 (.02)
Non-verifiable details 91.72 (38.19) 147.00 (59.10) 149.72 (49.43)
Length of the statements 264.44 (100.77) 411.00 (154.39) 427.11 (157.43)
Note: Length of statementsD number of words.
p< .01.
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F(2, 50) D 4.88; p D .01, h2 D .16, and exer-
cise-related non-verifiable details, F(2, 50) D
7.26, p D .001, h2 D .23. Post hoc compari-
sons using Bonferroni procedure indicated that
na€ıve malingerers provided significantly more
symptom-related non-verifiable details than
truth-tellers (p D .01), and coached malinger-
ers reported significantly more exercise-related
non-verifiable details than truth-tellers (p D
.001). The two malingering groups did not dif-
fer with regard to the number of symptom-
related and exercise-related non-verifiable
details (p D .16; p D .26, respectively).
No significant group differences emerged
for number of symptom-related verifiable, F(2,
50)D 0.59, pD .56, exercise-related verifiable,
F(2, 50) D 0.17, pD .84, and neutral verifiable
and non-verifiable details [F(2, 50) D 0.45;
pD .64; F(2, 50)D 1.94; pD .15, respectively].
Length of statements
We calculated the total number of words for
each of the three groups (length of state-
ments). The three groups did differ with
regard to this parameter, F(2, 50) D 7.36, p D
.002, h2 D .23. Both naive malingerers and
coached malingerers produced longer state-
ments than truth-tellers [t(33) D 3.34, p D
.002, d D 1.13; t(34) D 3.69, p D .001, d D
1.23, respectively]. Follow-up t tests indi-
cated that the two malingering groups did not
differ from each other with respect to state-
ment length, t(33) < 1.0.
Discussion
The principal aim of this research was to
investigate whether the verifiability approach
(Nahari & Vrij, 2014) could be used to dis-
criminate effectively between truth-tellers,
na€ıve malingerers and coached malingerers.
Their reports concerned a physical exercise
and the symptoms it elicited. Additionally,
we examined whether an explicit strategy of
embedding lies in previous true experiences
would result in coached malingerers provid-
ing more verifiable details and, in doing so,
would render their reports more convincing
than those of na€ıve malingerers.
The results of our study can be summa-
rized as follows. First, both malingering
groups provided significantly more non-veri-
fiable details than truth-tellers. More pre-
cisely, compared with truth-tellers, coached
malingerers produced more non-verifiable
information describing the exercise itself,
whereas na€ıve malingerers generated more
non-verifiable details about their symptoms.
This might be a result of differences in the
instructions, or shows how malingerers had
different strategies compared with truth-tell-
ers in presenting themselves as honest. We
have no ready explanation for this pattern,
and it requires replication to determine
whether differences in types of non-verifiable
details between malingerers and truth-tellers
is a robust phenomenon.
Second, truth-tellers and malingerers did
not differ in terms of number or proportion of
Table 2. Groups on symptom-related, exercise-related and neutral verifiable and non-verifiable details.
Codes
Truth-tellers
M (SD)
Na€ıve malingerers
M (SD)
Coached malingerers
M (SD)
Verifiable Symptom-related 1.00 (4.00) 1.76 (5.32) .34 (1.44)
Exercise-related 2.22 (4.71) 1.82 (4.33) 1.45 (2.64)
Neutral 3.56 (7.75) 3.82 (6.89) 1.89 (4.69)
Non-verifiable Symptom-related 37.95 (22.51) 66.47 (36.36) 48.12 (21.01)
Exercise-related 43.28 (22.84) 63.53 (32.32) 81.00 (33.08)
Neutral 10.67 (6.24) 17.00 (14.55) 20.62 (21.27)
p< .01. p < .001.
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verifiable details reported. Furthermore, the
use of embedded lies as a strategy did not con-
tribute to more (false) verifiable statements by
participants in the coached malingering condi-
tion, while truth-tellers generated verifiable
details at a low base rate The low overall pro-
duction of verifiable details (4.4%) suggests
that even for truth-tellers, reporting verifiable
details when describing the physical exercise
and the symptoms it elicited was an arduous
task. Together with our previous findings
(Boskovic et al., 2017), our results indicate
that in the context of symptoms reporting, an
extensive number of non-verifiable details
might be more of a red flag for malingering
than the lack of verifiable details. The
increased number of non-verifiable details in
malingerers’ reports fits with some clinical
observations about the way malingerers talk
about their symptoms. For example, Resnick
and Knoll (2005) noted malingerers’ tendency
to provide vague descriptions of their symp-
toms. Our findings are also consistent with
those of Akehurst et al., 2015, who found
malingerers to produce more unusual details
than truth-tellers.
Closely related to their tendency to report
more non-verifiable details than truth-tellers,
malingerers’ reports were significantly longer
than those of truth-tellers. This replicates our
previous results (Boskovic et al., 2017). It
appears that malingerers in the current study
tried to avoid reporting information that
might have enabled the researchers to detect
that they did not actually participate in the
symptom-eliciting exercise or in the break
that followed the exercise. Thus, they com-
pensated for the absence of specific informa-
tion by providing more non-verifiable details
(e.g. Vrij et al., 2016). On the other hand,
truth-tellers did not generate an abundance of
verifiable details, possibly because they
believed that their honesty would shine
through. The ‘illusion of transparency’ that
truth-tellers might have has been described in
several domains (e.g. interrogations; Hartwig,
Granhag, & Str€omwall, 2007; Savitsky &
Gilovich, 2003).
The current study, as well as previous
work (Akehurst et al., 2015; Boskovic et al.,
2017), indicates that, if anything, malingerers
produce more lengthy reports about their
symptoms than do truth-tellers. This pattern
is difficult to reconcile with the DSM–5
assumption that malingerers are uncoopera-
tive and reluctant to talk about their symp-
toms (Rogers, 2008). It also contradicts the
widespread belief that malingerers will expe-
rience difficulties when elaborating their fab-
ricated symptoms and that their symptom
reports will, therefore, be brief and less con-
vincing (Ali, Jabeen, & Alam, 2015).
One limitation of our study was the lack
of consequences for providing false verifiable
details. To illustrate, one of the na€ıve malin-
gerers wrote: ‘I am obese and I have a herni-
ated disc.’ In theory, the health history and
current health state of an individual are
checkable (Nahari & Vrij, 2014), and so this
was scored as a verifiable detail. However,
we did pre-screen every participant for any
health problems, and this participant did not
report these problems in advance of the study.
Thus, he provided a false verifiable detail.
Given the absence of consequences for
deceiving the interviewer, it is possible that
participants were not particularly concerned
about lying about a witness alibi or other veri-
fiable details. The verifiability approach is
likely to be more effective in settings where
serious consequences for providing false veri-
fiable details are present. Therefore, future
research might want to examine verifiability
effects in clinical settings where there are real
consequences associated with the detection of
malingering. A second limitation is that the
exercise that participants had to perform was
familiar to everyone, and therefore an easy
starting point for confabulation and malinger-
ing. It might be worthwhile to explore verifi-
ability effects with less common symptoms (
e.g. hearing voices) in order to determine
whether genuine patients report more verifi-
able details than malingerers.
One could argue that due to the subjective
nature of symptoms, the verifiability
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approach cannot be used as a tool to detect
malingering. However, even everyday symp-
toms often have behavioural consequences
that are open to verification (e.g. telling a
family member or friend about the symptom;
Verbrugge & Ascione, 1987). Moreover,
there are types of psychopathology that
include both subjective symptoms and verifi-
able elements. Based on our studies so far,
we expect that the verifiability approach is
not a powerful tool to detect feigned symp-
toms per se. However, it might well be that
the verifiability approach is effective in
screening for confabulated stories about
trauma exposure. This issue requires further
study.
Conclusion
Based on the current results and those of our
previous study, we conclude that non-verifi-
able details are a better indicator of malinger-
ing than lack of verifiable details. Relatedly,
unlike the clinical impression that malinger-
ers provide brief accounts of their symptoms,
we and others (Akehurst et al., 2015) found
that malingerers tend to produce extensive
symptom reports.
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Appendix 2
Instructions for participants
Instruction for truth-tellers
Welcome to this experiment about perception of
internal sensations. During this brief experiment,
you will be given two tasks. For the first task, you
will have to go down to the ground floor and back
to the third floor, twice, walking as fast as you can
(running). After the task, you will be given time to
rest. We would like you to go to the library, restau-
rant, have a walk, doing whatever you want. Please
return after 30 min. You will be then given paper
and pen in order for you to write statements about
your sensations and experience during the experi-
ment. You may write not only about what you felt,
thought and saw during the exercise, but also about
the immediate period thereafter and what you did
during the break. It is important that you explain
your sensations and your experience with as many
details as possible. If you succeed in convincing
researchers that you suffered from a high level of
physical distress because of this experiment you
will be rewarded a bonus credit or an additional
€7.5 voucher. All in all, the experiment will last
for about 1 hour. You are able to stop during the
experiment at any time. If you have any question,
please let us know.
Instruction for na€ıve malingerers
Welcome to this experiment about perception of
internal sensations. During this brief experiment,
you will be given two tasks. First task is to imagine
that you just had an exercise and that you run the
stairs from the third floor to the ground floor and
back, twice, after which you had a 30 minutes
break, in which you could go to the library, restau-
rant, have a walk, whatever you wanted. Imagine
all the sensations you felt and action you took after
the exercise. It is crucial to try to imagine that
experience with as many details as possible. The
second task is to write everything about the exer-
cise (what you felt, thought and saw), as well about
the period after the exercise and what did you do
and where did you go. Try to convince us that you
really had that experience 30 minutes ago. So, try
to write a detailed statement about your exercise
(running up and down the stairs), about sensations
you feel as a consequence of that, and the period
after the exercise. It is important that you explain
your sensations and your experience with as many
details as possible. If you succeed in convincing
researchers that you suffered from a high level of
physical distress because of this experiment you
will be rewarded a bonus credit or an additional
€7.5 voucher. All in all, the experiment will last
for about 1 hour. You are able to stop during the
experiment at any time. If you have any question,
please let us know.
Instruction for coached malingerers
Welcome to this experiment about perception of
internal sensations. You are the second group in
this study. The first group had to do physical exer-
cise before this part of experiment, and it included
fast walking (running) the stairs from third to the
ground floor and back, twice, as fast as possible.
After the exercise they had 30 minutes break dur-
ing which they had freedom to go and do what-
ever they want (for example, go to library,
restaurant, have a walk, doing whatever they
wanted). Basically, your main task will be to
write a statement which will convince us that you
are a part of the first group. To do so you will be
given two tasks. The first task is to recall the last
time you had an intense physical exercise (run-
ning, walking the stairs) and all the sensations
you felt then and thoughts you had. It isn’t impor-
tant when that experience has happened, but it is
crucial to try to recall that memory with as many
details as possible. The second task is to write
everything you can remember about your sensa-
tions and thoughts but as if they are consequences
of the exercise you just had 30 minutes ago, walk-
ing up and down the stairs from zero to the third
floor and back, as fast as possible. So, try to write
a detailed statement about your previous sensa-
tions as if you just had them as a result of this spe-
cific activity, even though you didn’t have that
experience. You should write not only about your
sensations and thoughts during the exercise, but
also describe the immediate period thereafter and
what did you do and where did you go. Again, it
is important to explain your sensations and your
experience with as many details as possible. If
you succeed in convincing researchers that you
suffered from high level of physical distress
because of this experiment you will be rewarded
bonus credit or an additional €7.5 voucher. All in
all, the experiment will last for about 1 hour. You
are able to stop during the experiment at any
time. If you have any question, please let us
know.
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